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  We model group formation as a response to relative deprivation. We employ a 
simple measure of relative deprivation. We show that the process of deprivation-
induced self-selection into groups reaches a unique steady state. We study the social 
welfare implications of the deprivation-induced process of group formation and show 
that when individuals are left to pursue their betterment the resulting state tends to fall 
short of the best social outcome. We present several implications of the model 
including federalism and the demand for secession.   
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People who transact individually in markets also belong to groups.  Both the outcome 
of the market exchange and the satisfaction arising from the group affiliation impinge 
on well-being.  But how and why do groups form and dissolve?  The pleasure or 
dismay that arise from group membership can be captured in a number of ways and 
relative position is an appealing measure.  A plausible response to transacting in a 
market that confers an undesirable outcome is to transact in another market (when the 
latter exists and participation in it is feasible).  Labor migration is an obvious example.  
Similarly, a reaction to a low relative position in a given group could be a change in 
group affiliation.  What happens then when people who care about their relative 
position in a group have the option to react by either staying in the group or exiting 
from it? 
 
We study this particular response in order to gain some insight into how 
groups form when individuals care about their relative position.  To enable us to 
focus on essentials, we confine ourselves to an extremely stark environment. We hold 
the incomes of all the individuals fixed
1, we use a payoff function that is the negative 
of the sum of the income differences between one individual and others in his group 
who have higher incomes, we start with all individuals belonging to a single group 
(exit is not an option) and then allow the formation of a second group (exit is feasible), 
and we allow costless movement between groups.  We derive stark and unexpected 
results.  We find that the process converges to a unique steady state equilibrium of 
individuals across groups wherein clusters of income sub-groups exist in each group. 
There is no unique cut-off point above or below which individuals move.  We also 
characterize and explore the social welfare repercussions of the process, and list 
several implications of our analysis. 
 
Interestingly, the result of a non-uniform equilibrium distribution has already 
been derived, at least twice, in the very context that constitutes our primary example, 
                                                 
1 When utility is derived both from absolute income and from relative income, and the utility function 
is additively separable, the difference in utilities across groups is reduced to the difference that arises 
from levels of relative income.  Holding absolute incomes constant should not then be taken to imply 
that the individual does not care about his absolute income, and it enables us to study behavior that is 
purely due to considerations of relative income. 
  1 that is, migration.  Stark (1993, chapter 12) studies migration under asymmetric 
information with signaling.  Employers at destination do not know the skill levels of 
individual workers – they only know the skill distribution. Employers are assumed to 
pay all indistinguishable workers the same wage based on the average product of the 
group of workers.  Employers at origin, however, know the skill levels of individual 
workers and pay them a wage based on their marginal product.  When a signaling 
device that enables a worker’s skill level to be completely identified exists, and when 
the cost of the device is moderate, the equilibrium distribution of the workers is such 
that the least skilled migrate without investing in the signaling device, the most 
skilled invest in the signaling device and migrate, and the medium skilled do not 
migrate.  Banerjee and Newman (1998) derive a qualitatively similar result.  They 
study a developing economy that consists of two sectors: a modern, high productivity 
sector in which people have poor information about each other, and a traditional, low 
productivity sector in which information is good.  Since from time to time people 
need consumption loans that are subject to default, collateral is essential.  The 
superior information available in the traditional sector enables lenders to better 
monitor borrowers there as opposed to the modern sector.  The superior access to 
credit in the traditional sector conditional on the supply of collateral, and the higher 
productivity in the modern sector prompt migration from the traditional sector to the 
modern sector by the wealthiest and most productive workers, and by the poorest and 
least productive employees.  The wealthy leave because they can finance 
consumption on their own and do not need loans; the most productive leave because 
they have much to gain; and the poorest and the least productive leave because they 
have nothing to lose – they cannot get a loan in either location. 
 
A crucial assumption of both Stark’s and Banerjee and Newman’s models is 
that information is asymmetric.  So far, no migration study has analytically generated 
an equilibrium distribution of three distinct groups under symmetric information, nor 
has a migration study analytically generated an equilibrium distribution of more than 
three groups.  As the present study yields an equilibrium distribution of more than 
three groups, and it does so under symmetric information, our study contributes to the 
theory of migration.  It also contributes to the large and growing literature on the 
theory of non-market, social interactions pioneered by Schelling (1971, 1972) and 
  2 recently added to, among many others, by Stark (1999), Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(2000) who provide a useful synthesis, and Becker and Murphy (2001). 
 
2. Preliminaries  
 
You board a boat in Guilin in order to take a ride through the river Lijiang going by 
Guilin. You can stand either on the port side (left deck) or on the starboard side (right 
deck) admiring the beautiful cliffs hanging high above the two banks of the river. 
With you on the port side stand other passengers several of whom are taller than you. 
They block some of your view of the scenery. You notice that the starboard is empty 
so you move there, only to find that other passengers who were disturbed by taller  
passengers have also moved to the starboard side. You find yourself grouped with 
others who block your view, which prompts you, as well as some other passengers, to 
return to the port side. And so on. Do these shifts come to a halt? Is so, what will the 
steady-state distribution of passengers between the two decks look like? Will the 
steady-state distribution confer the best possible social viewing arrangement? 
 
  Incomes in the small region R where you live are fully used for visible 
consumption purposes. Any income (consumption) in your region higher than yours 
induces discomfort – it makes you feel relatively deprived. Another region, R , 
identical in all respects to your region except that initially it is unpopulated, opens up 
and offers the possibility that you, and for that matter anyone else, can costlessly 
move to R . Who moves and who stays? Will all those who move to R  stay in  ? 
Will some return? And will some of those who return move once more? Will a 
steady-state distribution of the population across the two regions emerge? If so, will 
the steady-state distribution be unique? And at the steady-state distribution, will the 
aggregate deprivation of the population be lower than the initial aggregate deprivation? 




  The idea that discontent can arise not only from having a low wage but also 
from having a wage that is lower than that of others and that an unfavorable 
comparison could induce a departure for work elsewhere where wages are higher, 
without changing the set of individuals with whom comparisons are made, was taken 
  3 up in the literature on relative deprivation and migration. Earlier studies include Stark 
(1984), Stark and Yitzhaki (1988), and Stark and Taylor (1989,1991). The key idea of 
this body of work is that a comparison of the income of i (an individual, a household, 
a family) with the incomes of others who are richer in i’s reference group results in i’s 
feeling of relative deprivation. The associated negative utility impinges on migration 
behavior. Our empirical work suggests that relative deprivation is a significant 
explanatory variable of migration behavior.
2 
 
Yet a second response could be to sever one’s ties with the offensive set; 
association with another set, without a change in one’s income, could also dampen 
relative deprivation. This reaction is the subject of the present paper.
3 The  main 
questions are: Does the process of group formation in response to relative deprivation 
reach a steady state (wherein all moves cease and no one is able to reduce his relative 
deprivation through further moves)? Does the process of group formation by 
individuals in response to their aversion to relative deprivation lower societal relative 
deprivation? Does it minimize societal relative deprivation? We study the relationship 
between relative deprivation and group formation by employing a simple measure of 
relative deprivation: the relative deprivation of an individual whose income is   and 
whose reference group consists of n   individuals whose incomes are x  is 
defined as D  and   if   for  . The 
linearity of this measure implies that regardless of their distribution, all units of 
income in excess of one’s own are equally distressing.  
j x
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2 The twin ideas that people compare themselves with others in their reference group, and that the outcome 
of the comparison impinges on their wellbeing and behavior, have been pursued in the economics 
literature quite extensively. Thus, it has been argued that given the set of individuals with whom 
comparisons are made, an unfavorable comparison could induce harder work. This idea is captured and 
developed in the literature on performance incentives in career games and other contests. (Early studies 
include Lazear and Rosen (1981), Rosen (1986), and Stark (1990).) Loewenstein, Thompson, and 
Bazerman (1989) provide evidence that individuals strongly dislike being in an income distribution in 
which “comparison persons” earn more. Clark and Oswald (1996) present evidence that “comparison 
incomes” have a significant negative impact on overall job satisfaction. 
 
3 Holding income constant (as if the individual were born with an income) enables us to study group 
selection behavior that is purely due to relative deprivation.  The present paper can thus be considered as 
the dual of earlier work: while in past work the reference group was held constant and migration with a 
gain in income served to reduce relative deprivation within a given reference group, the present paper 
holds income constant and relative deprivation is reduced through a substitution of reference groups. 
  4   We embark on the study of the relationship between deprivation and group 
formation by considering an example. We list several results suggested by the 
example. We next develop a general approach that we use to substantiate results 
suggested by the example and to derive additional results. We address the issues of 
convergence of the group-formation process to a steady state, uniqueness of the 
steady state, and social welfare. In conclusion, we offer several conjectures and 
reflect on issues that pertain to the distaste for relative deprivation. 
 
3. Self-Segregation 
3.1 An Example 
 
Define the deprivation of an individual whose income is   as  . Suppose there 
are two groups, A  and  , and that an individual’s deprivation arises only from 
comparisons with other individuals in his group; nothing else matters. We abstract 
from the intrinsic value of  . However, this is of no consequence whatsoever since x 
is retained (the individual’s income is held constant) across groups. We are thus able 
to study group-formation behavior that is purely due to deprivation. The individual 
prefers to be affiliated with the group in which his deprivation is lower. When equally 
deprived (a tie), the individual does not change groups. The individual cannot take 
into account the fact that other individuals behave in a similar fashion. However, the 
individual’s payoff, or utility, depends on the actions of all other individuals whose 
incomes are higher than his. A key feature of this situation is that tomorrow’s group-
selection behavior of every individual is his best reply to today’s selection actions of 
other individuals. What will the group-selection path emanating from the difference 
equation above, and the associated behavior, look like? What will be the steady-state 
allocation of individuals across the two groups? 




  In this section, we examine a simple case in which there are ten individuals 
and individual i   receives an income of i ,  . Suppose that initially all 
individuals  1  are in group A.  Group B just comes into existence. (For example, 
A can be a village, B - a city; A can be a region or a country, B - another region or 
country; and so on. In cases such as these we assume that the individual does not care 
10   , , 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = i
1   , ⋅ 0 , ⋅ ⋅
  5 at all about the regions themselves and that moving from one region to another is 
costless.) Measuring time discretely, we will observe the following series of 
migratory moves. In period 1, all individuals except 10 move from A to B because the 
deprivation of individual 10 is zero, while the deprivation of all other individuals is 
strictly positive. In period 2, individuals 1 through 6 return from B  to   because 
every individual in region B, except 9, 8, and 7, is more deprived in B than in A. 
When an individual cannot factor in the contemporaneous response of other 
individuals, his decision is made under the assumption of no group substitution by 
these individuals. In period 3, individual 1 prefers to move from A to B rather than be 
in A, and the process comes to a halt. What seems to be particularly interesting about 
this example is that after three periods, a steady state is reached such that the 10th and 
6th through 2nd individuals are in region A, while the 9th through 7th and 1st 
individuals are in group B. Figure 1 below diagrammatically illustrates this example. 
A
 





   Region 
         A 
Region 
B 
    Region 
           A 
Region 
B 
  Region 
         A 
Region 
B 
 10       10       10       10   
   9        9      9      9 
   8        8      8      8 
   7        7      7      7 
   6        6       6         6   
   5        5       5         5   
   4        4       4         4   
   3        3       3         3   
   2        2       2         2   
   1        1       1        1 
 
Figure 1. The Group-Formation Process and the Steady-State Distribution 
 
What can be learned from this simple example? First, a well-defined rule is in 
place, which enables us to predict group affiliation and steady-state distribution 
across groups. Second, until a steady state is reached, a change in group affiliation by 
any individual n is associated with a change in group affiliation by all individuals 
. Third, the number of individuals changing affiliation in a period is 
declining in the (rank) order of the period. Fourth, the number of inter-group moves 
by individuals never rises in their income; individuals with low incomes change 
affiliations at least as many times as individuals with higher incomes. Fifth, the 
1 , , 2 , 1 − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = n i
  6 deprivation motive leads to a stratification steady-state distribution where clusters of 
income groups exist in each region rather than having a unique cut-off point above or 
below which individuals move.  
 
  In the following section, we present an analytical framework that facilitates a 
rigorous examination of several issues pertaining to deprivation and group formation. 
 
3.2 Deprivation and Self-Segregation: An Analytical Framework 
 
For the sake of concreteness and ease of reference we refer in this section to regions 
and to migration. The general setting, however, is of groups and group selection.  
 
Consider two regions   and  .  There are n individuals whose incomes are 
, where x   with at least one inequality holding strictly. In any 
period  , each individual chooses between two actions: to migrate or to stay. 
We introduce the following notations: x ,  , 
. In addition, we denote the distribution of individuals at period t in 
region  ,  , by R  where   if the ith individual is 
in region l at period t, and where r  otherwise. Assuming that initially all n 
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  7 is the maximal deprivation that individual i could have. It follows from (1) that 
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 Let  m  be the number of migratory moves by individual i. We then have the 
following: 
i
Proposition 1: Given the above setup, m  for i .  i n i − ≤ n , , 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
Proof: By (2), D  and  , and hence m  and  . 
Assume that m . Now consider individual i’s action. By (3), 
. Note that all individuals with incomes higher than 
i have “settled down.” Thus, in the cases where D  and 
individual  i is in region B  or   and  individual  i is in 
region  , the individual migrates one more time and then “settles down” for 
ever; in all other cases, individual i will not migrate any more. This yields 
. Since m  by the induction assumption, we obtain 
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  Proposition 1 asserts that the process of group formation in response to 




Proposition 2: Under the assumption that all individuals are in region A initially and 
the individual does not migrate when equally deprived (a tie), the process of 
migration in response to deprivation reaches a unique steady state. 
 
Proof:  Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a steady state for the process of 
migration in response to deprivation. We now prove the uniqueness of the 
steady state by way of contradiction. Suppose that there are two steady-state 
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without loss of generality, we assume that  1 ) ( = t j r . Thus, in the steady-state 
distribution  )) ( ), ( t R t B A (R , individual    is in region A and hence  j
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  Several comments are in order. First, we note that the example presented in 
Section 2.1 constitutes a special case of our general framework wherein 
,  , and x  in (1) and in D  is replaced by i . In 
this special case the maximum deprivation that an individual can have (as follows 
from (2)) is 
, , ( 1 x ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
. 
 
  Second, suppose we retain all the assumptions of our general approach except 
that when equally deprived in A and B, the individual prefers A to B (an infinitesimal 
home preference). Propositions 1 and 2 carry through, even though the specific steady 
state reached in this case may well differ from the specific steady state reached under 
the original assumption that when equally deprived (a tie) the individual does not 
migrate. Looking again at the example of Section 3.1 we will have the sequence 
shown in Figure 2. Interestingly, in the case of (  and  an 
infinitesimal home preference, the number of periods it takes to reach the steady state 
is equal to the number of complete pairs in n, and the number of individuals who end 
)
  9 up locating in A is 
2
n
 when  n = 2m, 
2
1 − n
 when  n = 4m  − 1 or 
2
1 + n
 when  
n = 4m − 3, where m is a positive integer.   
 
 Period 0         Period 1        Period 2       Period 3 
 Region 
          A 
Region 
B 
   Region 
          A 
Region 
B 
    Region 
           A 
Region 
B 
  Region 
         A 
Region 
B 
 10       10          10       10   
   9        9      9      9 
   8        8      8      8 
   7        7       7         7   
   6        6       6         6   
   5        5       5           5 
   4        4       4           4 
   3        3       3           3 
   2        2       2           2 
   1        1       1        1 
 
 Period 4   Period 5 
 Region 
         A 
Region 
B 
   Region 
          A 
Region 
B 
 10       10   
 9     9 
 8     8 
  7         7   
  6         6   
 5        5 
 4        4 
  3         3   
  2         2   
  1         1 
 
Figure 2.  The Migration Process and the Steady-State Distribution with 
an Infinitesimal Home Preference 
 
  Third, changing the incomes of all individuals by the same factor will have no 
effect on the pattern of migration. This homogeneity of degree zero property can be 
expected; when the payoff functions are linear in income differences, populations with 
income distributions that are linear transformations of each other should display the 
same migration behavior.  Using our analytical framework this property can be readily 
stated and proved. 
 
  10 Corollary: Given the above setup and a real number  , the ith individuals in the 
two populations P  and    have the same 
number of migratory moves, where  .   
0 > α
, 1 x ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ α
n x
} , , { 1 n x x ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = } , { n x P ⋅ ⋅ = α α
≤ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ x1
Proof: Let m  and   be the numbers of migratory moves by the ith individuals in 
the two populations P  and  , respectively.   
One can easily see that m  and  . Assume that 
, for  . This implies that 
, where l . Then, by (1), we 
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 where  A l = . Recall that   is a positive real number.  The implication of (4) 
is that, in choosing to migrate or to stay, the ith individuals in the two 
populations   and   take the same action at 




} , , { 1 n x x ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = } , , { 1 n x x P ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = α α α
 
  Thus, the propensity prompted by aversion to deprivation to engage in 
migration by a rich population is equal to the propensity to engage in migration by a 
uniformly poorer population. Migration is independent of the general level of wealth 
of a population.   
 
3.4 Societal Deprivation 
 
Suppose we measure social welfare by the inverse of the population’s total 
deprivation, where total deprivation is the sum of the deprivations of all the 
individuals constituting the population. It follows that social welfare is maximized 
when total deprivation is minimized. While the social welfare associated with the 
steady-state distribution 
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Region 
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is higher than the social welfare associated with the initial period 0 allocation, 
individualistic group-formation behavior fails to produce maximal social welfare. The 
minimal total deprivation (TD) obtains when (  are  in  A and   
 are in B where 
) , , 1 , i n n L −




i  if   is an even number and, as can be 














  In the general case, where   are not 1  no unequivocal 
conclusion can be drawn. Sometimes the steady-state distribution gives rise to the 
minimal TD, sometimes it does not. For example, when the individuals’ incomes are 
, the steady-state distribution    
n x x x ≤ ≤ ≤ L 2 1 , , , 2 , n L
) 1 , 2 , 10 (
 
Region 







is socially optimal.  When the individuals’ incomes are     ) 1 , 9 , 10 (,
                                                 
4 The proof is in the Appendix. 
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Region 







is the steady-state distribution; while 
  
Region 




  9   
 1 
 
is the optimal social allocation. 
 
  As long as the number of different incomes is larger than the number of 
(reference) groups, total relative deprivation will not be minimized at zero. If there 
are as many groups as there are different incomes, total relative deprivation will be 
zero. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Complementary Reflections 
 
Individuals belong to groups, clubs, neighborhoods, and associations. When given a 
choice, individuals may want to revise their affiliation – form a new group, change 
their neighborhood, join another club, associate with others. Several considerations, 
both absolute and relative, impinge on these choices. In this paper we have singled 
out for close scrutiny one such consideration – the distaste of relative deprivation. We 
have studied several repercussions when this measure is used as the exclusive 
determinant of affiliation.  
 
  We have assumed a given and uniform dislike of relative deprivation. Relative 
deprivation is a sensitive measure that encompasses rank-related information beyond 
mere rank. (It tells us that 1 compared to 3 is worse than 1 compared to 2, even 
though in both instances 1’s rank is second.) An important question that is not 
addressed in this paper is where the aversion to relative deprivation or, for that matter, 
  13 the distaste for low rank, originates. Postlewaite (1998) argues that since over the 
millennia high rank conferred an evolutionary advantage in the competition for food 
and mating opportunities, the concern for rank is likely to be hardwired (part of the 
genetic structure). More generally though, any setting in which rank impinges 
positively - directly or indirectly - on consumption ought to imply a concern for 
rank.
5 The study of why an aversion to relative deprivation exists and why individuals 
exhibit distaste for low rank invites more attention. 
 
  It is plausible to stipulate that the distaste for low rank will not be uniform 
across societies. Consequently, the extent of self-segregation across societies will 
vary. Since segregation is visible, whereas preferences are not, an inference may be 
drawn from the observed segregation to the motivating distaste, with more 
segregation suggesting stronger distaste. 
 
  We have shown that when individuals who initially belong to one group 
(costlessly) act upon their distaste of relative deprivation and self-select into any one 
of two groups, they do not end up splitting into a uniformly low income group and a 
uniformly high income group. Again, since the result of self-segregation is visible 
while the underlining motives are not, the presence of clusters in each group will 
suggest that relative deprivation plays a key role in determining affiliation, while a 
uniform division will suggest that considerations of relative deprivation do not bear 
overwhelmingly on affiliation choices.  
 
We have described an endogenous process of voluntary segmentation into 
distinct groups; the division of the population into groups is not the outcome of an 
exogenous imposition of segregation. Assuming no comparisons between members of 
one group and another, we have shown that, as a consequence, aggregate relative 
deprivation is lowered. In broader contexts, the group partitioning could also be 
associated with improved social welfare as a result of reduced social tensions, fewer 
conflicts, less crime, and a mediated quest for status (as the inequality between those 
who compete with each other for status is reduced). 
 
                                                 
 
5 In poor societies with meager assets, rank can serve as a proxy for collateral, thereby facilitating the 
attainment of credit.  
  14 The opening of another region, B, facilitates shedding one’s relative 
deprivation. Consider a reverse process, wherein regions A and B merge into a single 
composite region that constitutes everyone’s reference group. In all cases (except the 
degenerate case in which all individuals have exactly the same income) the 
population’s relative deprivation is bound to rise. Groups who are less well off in 
terms of absolute income will be better off in terms of wellbeing if they are allowed 
to secede, without any change in absolute income. Conversely, a group that is less 
well off in terms of absolute income that is forced to merge with a group that is better 
off in terms of absolute income becomes worse off. The pressure to form a separate 
state, for example, can be partially attributed to this aversion to relative deprivation; 
when such an aversion exists, the sole individual with less than 1 in B may prefer that 
option to having 1 in A, where 2 is present.  
 
  These considerations relate to federalism. The process of adding new 
members to a federation of nations usually draws on the expectation that in the wake 
of the integration, the incomes of the citizens of the new member nations will rise. 
The European Union, however, has taken great pains to ensure that the incomes of the 
citizens of the would-be member nations rise substantially prior to integration. Our 
approach suggests a rationale. To the extent that integration entails the formation of a 
new reference group, relative deprivation when 1 joins 2 would be reduced if 1½ 
were to join 2, and would be eliminated altogether if 2 were to join 2. 
  15 Appendix  
 
To find the division of a population of n individuals across groups A and B that 
confers the minimal total deprivation (TD) we proceed in two steps. First given the 
size of the two groups, we show that the minimal TD is reached when high income 
individuals are in one of the groups and low income individuals are in the other group. 
(That is, the income of any individual who is in one group is higher than the income 
of any individual who is in the other group.) Second, given this distribution, we show 
that the minimal TD is reached when half of the individuals are in one group and the 
other half are in the other group. 
 
Lemma: Let n be a fixed positive integer. Consider {}  where 
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,...,n  i ,
i i a a
1 1 + = + i i a ( n a a ,..., 2 a , 1
1 − ,..., 2 , 1 = n i
3
1
2 − n n
.)     Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary: Consider the configuration of incomes ( . Let there be two 
groups, A and B, with 
) n n , 1 ,..., 1 −
( )
A n i i i ,..., , 2 1  in A, and ( )
B n j j j ,..., , 2 1  in B,  . 
Let TD . Then, if n  are fixed, TD reaches its minimum if 
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1 = ) . Conversely, 
by the Lemma, we have that   ( ) () B A n n n TD i
A ,..., 1 ,..., + ≥ ( () A A n   or   i i ,..., 1 , 2 1 ) TD , 
and  ( )
B n B j j j ,..., , 2 1 TDB , 1 ≥ TD   .  Therefore, TD 
reaches its minimum at either of the two configurations. We thus proved the 
Corollary.  Q.E.D.  
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  From the Lemma we know that the minimum of S  is 
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we have that the minimal TD obtains when  0 =
A dn
dTD
, that is, 
2
n
A = n . Therefore, if n 
is an even number, half of the n individuals will be in each of the two groups. With 
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